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A Quantum-Proof Non-Malleable Extractor
With Application to Privacy Amplification against Active Quantum Adversaries
Divesh Aggarwal∗ Kai-Min Chung† Han-Hsuan Lin‡ Thomas Vidick§
Abstract
In privacy amplification, two mutually trusted parties aim to amplify the secrecy of an initial shared
secret X in order to establish a shared private key K by exchanging messages over an insecure communi-
cation channel. If the channel is authenticated the task can be solved in a single round of communication
using a strong randomness extractor; choosing a quantum-proof extractor allows one to establish security
against quantum adversaries.
In the case that the channel is not authenticated, Dodis and Wichs (STOC’09) showed that the
problem can be solved in two rounds of communication using a non-malleable extractor, a stronger
pseudo-random construction than a strong extractor.
We give the first construction of a non-malleable extractor that is secure against quantum adversaries.
The extractor is based on a construction by Li (FOCS’12), and is able to extract from source of min-
entropy rates larger than 1/2. Combining this construction with a quantum-proof variant of the reduction
of Dodis and Wichs, shown by Cohen and Vidick (unpublished), we obtain the first privacy amplification
protocol secure against active quantum adversaries.
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1 Introduction
Privacy amplification. We study the problem of privacy amplification [BBR88, Mau92, BBCM95, MW97]
(PA). In this problem, two parties, Alice and Bob, share a weak secret X (having min-entropy at least k).
Using X and an insecure communication channel, Alice and Bob would like to securely agree on a secret
key R that is ǫ-close to uniformly random even to an adversary Eve who may have full control over their
communication channel. This elegant problem has multiple applications including biometric authentication,
leakage-resilient cryptography, and quantum cryptography.
If the adversary Eve is passive, i.e., she is only able to observe the communication but may not alter the
messages exchanged, then there is a direct solution based on the use of a strong seeded randomness extractor
Ext [NZ96]. This can be done by Alice selecting a uniform seed Y for the extractor, and sending the seed
to Bob; Alice and Bob both compute the key R = Ext(X,Y ), which is close to being uniformly random and
independent of Y by the strong extractor property. The use of a quantum-proof extractor suffices to protect
against adversaries holding quantum side information about the secret X .
Privacy amplification is substantially more challenging when the adversary is active, i.e. Eve can not
only read but also modify messages exchanged across the communication channel. This problem has been
studied extensively [MW97, RW03, DKK+12, DW09, CKOR10, DLWZ14, CRS12, Li12c, Li12a, Li12b,
DY13, ADJ+14, Li15, CGL15, Coh15, AHL16, Li17], yielding constructions that are optimal in any of
the parameters involved in the problem, including the min-entropy k, the error ǫ, and the communication
complexity of the protocol.
Active adversaries with quantum side information. We consider the problem of active attacks by
quantum adversaries. This question arises naturally when privacy amplification is used as a sub-protocol,
e.g., as a post-processing step in quantum key distribution (QKD), when it may not be safe to assume
that the classical communication channel is authenticated.1 To the best of our knowledge the question was
first raised in [BF11], whose primary focus is privacy amplification with an additional property of source
privacy. Although the authors of [BF11] initially claimed that their construction is secure against quantum
side information, they later realized that there was an issue with their argument, and withdrew their claim
of quantum security. The only other work we are aware of approaching the question of privacy amplification
in the presence of active quantum adversaries is a paper by one of us [CV16]. In this paper it is shown that
a classical protocol for PA introduced by Dodis and Wichs [DW09] remains secure against active quantum
attacks when the main tool used in the protocol, a non-malleable extractor, is secure against quantum
side information (a notion that is also formally introduced in that paper, and to which we return shortly).
Unfortunately, the final contribution of [CV16], a construction of a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor,
also had a flaw in the proof, invalidating the construction. Thus, the problem of quantum-secure active
privacy amplification remained open.
It may be useful to discuss the difficulty faced by both these previous works, as it informed our own
construction. The issue is related to the modeling of the side information held by the adversary Eve, and
how that side information evolves as messages are being exchanged, and possibly modified, throughout the
privacy amplification protocol. To explain this, consider the setting for a non-malleable extractor. Here,
Alice initially has a secret X (the source), while Eve holds side information E, a quantum state, correlated
with X . Alice selects a uniformly random seed Y and computes Ext(X,Y ). However, in addition to receiving
Y (as would already be the case for a strong randomness extractor), Eve is also given the possibility to select
1QKD relies on an authenticated channel at other stages of the protocol, and here we only address the privacy amplification
part: indeed, PA plays an important role in multiple other cryptographic protocols, and it is a fundamental task that it is useful
to address first.
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an arbitrary Y ′ 6= Y and receive Ext(X,Y ′) as “advice” to help her break the extractor — i.e., distinguish
Ext(X,Y ) from uniform. Now, clearly in any practical scenario the adversary may use her side information
E in order to guide her choice of Y ′; thus Y ′ should be considered as the outcome of a measurement {My′y },
depending on Y = y and performed on E, which returns an outcome Y ′ = y′ and a post-measurement state
E′. This means that the security of the extractor should be considered with respect to the side information
E′. But due to the measurement, E′ may be correlated with both X and Y in a way that cannot be addressed
by standard techniques for the analysis of strong extractors. Indeed, even if E′ is classical, so that we can
condition on its value, X and Y may not be independent after conditioning on E′ = e′; due to the lack of
independence it is unclear whether extraction works.
The issue seems particularly difficult to accommodate when analyzing extractors based on the technique
of “alternate extraction”, as was attempted in [BF11, CV16]. In fact, in the original version of [BF11] the
issue is overlooked, resulting in a flawed security proof. In [CV16] the authors attempted to deal with the
difficulty by using the formalism of quantum Markov chains; unfortunately, there is a gap in the argument
and it does not seem like the scenario can be modeled using the Markov chain formalism. Note that in the
classical setting the issue does not arise: having fixed E = e we can consider Y ′ to be a fixed, deterministic
function of Y — there is no E′ to consider, and X is independent of both Y and Y ′ conditioned on E = e. In
this paper we do not address the issue, but instead focus on a specific construction of non-malleable extractor
whose security can be shown by algebraic techniques sidestepping the difficulty; we explain our approach in
more detail below.
Our results. We show that a non-malleable extractor introduced by Li [Li12c] in the classical setting is
secure against quantum side information. Combining this construction with the protocol of Dodis and Wichs
and its proof of security from [CV16], we obtain the first protocol for privacy amplification that is secure
against active quantum adversaries.
Before describing our results in more detail we summarize Li’s construction and its analysis for the
case of classical side information. The construction is based on the inner product function. Let p be a
prime, Fp the finite field with p elements, and 〈·, ·〉 the inner product over Fp. Consider the function
Ext : Fnp × Fnp → Fp given by Ext(X,Y ) := 〈X,Y 〉, where X ∈ Fnp is a weak secret with min-entropy
(conditioned on the adversary’s side information) assumed to be greater than (n log p)/2, and Y is a uniformly
random and independent seed. For this function to be a non-malleable extractor, it is required that Ext(X,Y )
is close to uniform and independent of Ext(X, f(Y )), where f is any adversarially chosen function such
that f(Y ) 6= Y for all Y . This is clearly not true, since if f(Y ) = cY for some c ∈ Fp \ {1}, then
Ext(X, f(Y )) = cExt(X,Y ), and hence we don’t get the desired independence. Thus, for such a construction
to work, it is necessary to encode the source Y as Enc(Y ), for a well-chosen function Enc, in such a way
that 〈X,Enc(Y )〉 − c · 〈X,Enc(f(Y ))〉 is hard to guess. The non-uniform XOR lemma [CRS12, AHL16]
shows that it is sufficient to show that 〈X,Enc(Y )〉 − c · 〈X,Enc(f(Y ))〉 = 〈X,Enc(Y ) − c · Enc(f(Y ))〉 is
close to uniform conditioned on Y and E. The encoding that we use in this paper (which is almost the
same as the encoding chosen by Li) is to take Y ∈ Fn/2p , and encode it as Y ‖Y 2, which we view as an
n-character string over Fp, with the symbol ‖ denoting concatenation of strings and the square taken by
first interpreting Y as an element of Fpn/2. Then it is not difficult to show that for any function f such that
f(Y ) 6= Y and any c, we have that (Y ‖Y 2) − (c · f(Y )‖c · f(Y )2) (taking the addition coordinatewise) has
min-entropy almost (n log p)/2. Thus, provided X has sufficiently high min-entropy and using the fact that
X and (Y ‖Y 2)− (c · f(Y )‖c · f(Y )2) are independent conditioned on E, the strong extractor property of the
inner product function gives the desired result.2
2This description is a little different from Li’s description since he was working with a field of size 2n, but we find it more
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Our main technical result is a proof of security of Li’s extractor, against quantum side information. We
show the following (we refer to Definition 10 for the formal definition of a quantum-proof non-malleable
extractor):
Theorem 1. Let p 6= 2 be a prime. Let n be an even integer. Then for any ǫ > 0 the function nmExt(X,Y ) :
Fnp×Fn/2p → Fp given by 〈X,Y ‖Y 2〉 is an (
(
n
2 + 6
)
log p−1+4 log 1ǫ , ǫ) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor.
We give the main ideas behind our proof of security for this construction, highlighting the points of
departure from the classical analysis. Subsequently, we explain the application to privacy amplification.
Proof ideas. We begin by generalizing the first step of Li’s argument, the reduction provided by the
non-uniform XOR lemma, to the quantum case. An XOR lemma with quantum side information is already
shown in [KK12], where the lemma is used to show security of the inner product unction as a two-source
extractor against quantum side information. This version is not sufficient for our purposes, and we establish
the following generalization, which may be of independent interest (we refer to Section 3 for additional
background and definitions):
Lemma 2. Let p be a prime power and t an integer. Let ρX0XE be a ccq state with X0 ∈ Fp and X =
(X1, . . . , Xt) ∈ Ftp. For all a = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Ftp, define a random variable Z = X0 + 〈a,X〉 = X0 +∑t
i=1 aiXi. Let ǫ ≥ 0 be such that for all a, 12 ‖ρaZE − UZ ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ. Then
1
2
∥∥ρX0XE − UX0 ⊗ ρXE∥∥1 ≤ p t+12
√
ǫ
2
. (1.1)
XOR lemmas are typically proved via Fourier-based techniques (including the one in [KK12]). Here
we instead rely on a collision probability-based argument inspired from [AHL16]. We prove Lemma 2 by
observing that such arguments generalize to the quantum setting, as in the proof of the quantum leftover
hash lemma in [TSSR11].
Based on the XOR lemma (used with t = 1), following Li’s arguments it remains to show that the random
variable 〈X, g(Y, Y ′)〉 ∈ Fp, where g(Y, Y ′) = Y ‖Y 2 − c(Y ′‖Y ′2) ∈ Fnp , is close to uniformly distributed from
the adversary’s point of view, specified by side information E′, for every c 6= 0 ∈ Fp. As already mentioned
earlier, this cannot be shown by a reduction to the security proof of the inner product function as a two-
source extractor against side information, as X and g(Y, Y ′) are not independent (not even conditioned on
the value of E′ when E′ is classical).
Instead, we are led to a more direct analysis which proceeds by formulating the problem as a communica-
tion task.3 We relate the task of breaking our construction — distinguishing 〈X, g(Y, Y ′)〉 from uniform —
to success in the following task. Alice is given access to a random variable X , and Bob is given a uniformly
random Y . Alice is allowed to send a quantum message E, correlated to X , to Bob. Bob then selects a
Y ′ 6= Y and returns a value b ∈ Fp. The players win if b = 〈X, g(Y, Y ′)〉. Based on our previous reductions
it suffices to show that no strategy can succeed with probability substantially higher than random in this
game, unless Alice’s initial message to Bob contains a large amount of information about X ; more precisely,
unless the min-entropy of X , conditioned on E, is less than half the length of X .
Note that the problem as we formulated it does not fall in standard frameworks for communication
complexity. In particular, it is a relation problem, as Bob is allowed to choose the value Y ′ to which his
convenient to work with a prime field.
3The correspondence between security of quantum-proof strong extractors and communication problems has been used
repeatedly before, see e.g. [GKK+07, KK12].
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prediction b applies. This seems to prevent us from using any prior results on the communication complexity
of the inner product function, and we develop an ad-hoc proof which may be of independent interest. We
approach the problem using the “reconstruction paradigm” (used in e.g. [DPVR12]), which amounts to
showing that from any successful strategy of the players one may construct a measurement for Bob which
completely “reconstructs” X , given E; if this can be achieved with high enough probability it will contradict
the min-entropy assumption on X , via its dual formulation as a guessing probability [KRS09]. We show this
by running Bob’s strategy “in superposition”, and applying a Fourier transform to recover a guess for X .
This argument is similar to one introduced in [CvDNT99, NS06]. We refer to Section 4.1 for more detail.
Application to privacy amplification. Finally we discuss the application of our quantum-proof non-
malleable extractor to the problem of privacy amplification against active quantum attacks, which is our
original motivation. The application is based on a breakthrough result by Dodis and Wichs [DW09], who
were first to show the existence of a two-round PA protocol with optimal (up to constant factors) entropy
loss L = Θ(log(1/ǫ)), for any initial min-entropy k. This was achieved by defining and showing the existence
of non-malleable extractors with very good parameters.
The protocol from [DW09] is recalled in Section 5. The protocol proceeds as follows. Alice sends
a uniformly random seed Y to Bob over the communication channel, which is controlled by Eve. Bob
receives a possibly modified seed Y ′. Then Alice computes a key K = nmExt(X,Y ), and Bob computes
K ′ = nmExt(X,Y ′). In the second round, Bob generates another uniformly random seed W ′, and sends W ′
together with T ′ = MACK′(W
′) to Alice, where MAC is a one-time message authentication code. Alice
receives a possibly modified T,W and checks whether T = MACK(W ). If yes, then the shared secret
between Alice and Bob is Ext(X,W ) = Ext(X,W ′) with overwhelming probability, where Ext is any strong
seeded extractor.
The security of this protocol intuitively follows from the following simple observation. If the adversary
does not modify Y , then K ′ = K, and so W ′ must be equal to W by the security of the MAC. If Y ′ 6= Y ,
then by the non-malleability property of nmExt, K is uniform and independent of K ′, and so it is impossible
for the adversary to predict MACK(W ) for any W even given K
′ and W ′.
Since [DW09] could not construct an explicit non-malleable extractor, they instead defined and con-
structed a so called a look-ahead extractor, which can be seen as a weakening of the non-malleability
requirement of a non-malleable extractor. This was done by using the alternating extraction protocol by
Dziembowski and Pietrzak [DP07].
In [CV16], Dodis and Wichs’ reduction is extended to the case of quantum side information, provided
that the non-malleable Extractor nmExt used in the protocol satisfies the approriate definition of quantum
non-malleability, and Ext is a strong quantum-proof extractor. Based on our construction of a quantum-
proof non-malleable extractor (Theorem 1) we immediately obtain a PA protocol that is secure as long as the
initial secret X has a min-entropy rate of (slightly more than) half. The result is formalized as Corollary 27
in Section 5.
Future work. There have been a series of works in the classical setting [DLWZ14, CRS12, Li12c, Li12a,
DY13, Li15, CGL15, Coh15, AHL16, Li17] that have given privacy amplification protocols (via constructing
non-malleable extractors or otherwise) that achieve near-optimal parameters. In particular, Li [Li17] con-
structed a non-malleable extractor that works for min-entropy k = Ω(log n+ log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)), where ǫ
is the error probability.
Our quantum-proof non-malleable extractor requires the min-entropy rate of the initial weak secret to
be larger than 1/2. We leave it as an open question whether one of the above-mentioned protocols that
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work for min-entropy rate smaller than 1/2 in the classical setting can be shown secure against quantum
side information.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
For p a prime power we let Fp denote the finite field with p elements. For any positive integer n, there is
a natural bijection φ : Fnp 7→ Fpn that preserves group addition and scalar multiplication, i.e., the following
hold:
• For all c ∈ Fp, and for all x ∈ Fnp , φ(c · x) = c · φ(x).
• For all x1, x2 ∈ Fnp , φ(x1) + φ(x2) = φ(x1 + x2).
We use this bijection to define the square of an element in Fnp , e.g. for y ∈ Fnp
y2 = φ−1
(
(φ(y))2
)
. (2.1)
We write 〈·, ·〉 for the inner product over Fnp . log denotes the logarithm with base 2.
We write H for an arbitrary finite-dimensional Hilbert space, L(H) for the linear operators on H, Pos(H)
for positive semidefinite operators, and D(H) ⊂ Pos(H) for positive semidefinite operators of trace 1 (density
matrices). A linear map L(H)→ L(H′) is CPTP if it is completely positive, i.e. T ⊗ Id(A) ≥ 0 for any d ≥ 0
and A ∈ Pos(H⊗ Cd), and trace-preserving.
We use capital letters A,B,E,X, Y, Z, . . . to denote quantum or classical random variables. Generally, the
letters near the beginning of the alphabet, such as A,B,E, represent quantum variables (density matrices
on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space), while the letters near the end, such as X,Y, Z represent classical
variables (ranging over a finite alphabet). We sometimes represent classical random variables as density
matrices diagonal in the computational basis, and write e.g. (A,B, . . . , E)ρ for the density matrix ρA,B,...,E .
For a quantum random variable A, we denote HA the Hilbert space on which the associated density matrix
ρA is supported, and dA its dimension. If X is classical we loosely identify its range {0, . . . , dX − 1} with the
space HX spanned by {|0〉X , . . . , |dX − 1〉X}. We denote IA the identity operator on HA. When a density
matrix specifies the states of two random variables, one of which is classical and the other is quantum, we
call it a classical-quantum(cq)-state. A cq state (X,E)ρ takes the form
ρXE =
∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxE ,
where the summation is over all x in the range of X and {ρxE} are positive semidefinite matrices with
Tr ρxE = px, where px is the probability of getting the outcome x when measuring the X register. Similarly, a
ccq state (X,Y,E)σ is a density matrix over two classical variables and one quantum variable, e.g. σXYE =∑
x,y |x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ σxyE . We will sometimes add or remove random variables from an already-specified
density matrix. When we omit a random variable, we mean the reduced density matrix, e.g. (Y,E)σ =
TrX(σXY E). When we introduce a classical variable, we meant that the classical variable is computed into
another classical register. For example, for a function F (·, ·) on variables X,Y ,
(F (X,Y ), X, Y,E)σ =
∑
f,x,y
δ(f, F (x, y))|f〉〈f | ⊗ |x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ σxyE ,
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where δ(·, ·) is the Kronecker delta function, and the summation over f is taken over the range of F . When
F is a random function, the density matrix is averaged over the appropriate probability distribution.
We use UΣ to denote the uniform distribution over a set Σ. For m-bit string {0, 1}m, we abbreviate
U{0,1}m as Um. For a classical random variable X , UX denote the uniform distribution over the range of X .
For p ≥ 1 we write ‖·‖p for the Schatten p-norm (for a normal matrix, this is the p-norm of the vector of
singular values). We write ‖·‖ for the operator norm.
We write ≈ǫ to denote that two density matrices are ǫ-close to each other in trace distance. For example,
(X,E)ρ ≈ǫ (UX , E)ρ means 12 ‖ρXE − UX ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ. Note that in case both X and E are classical random
variables, this reduces to the statistical distance.
2.2 Quantum information
The min-entropy of a classical random variable X conditioned on quantum side information E is defined as
follows.
Definition 3 (Min-entropy). Let ρXE ∈ D(HX ⊗HE) be a cq state. The min-entropy of X conditioned on
E is defined as
Hmin(X |E)ρ = max{λ ≥ 0 : ∃σE ∈ Pos(HE),Tr (σE) ≤ 1, s.t. 2−λIX ⊗ σE ≥ ρXE}.
When the state ρ with respect to which the entropy is measured is clear from context we simply write
Hmin(X |E) for Hmin(X |E)ρ.
Definition 4 ((n, k)-source). A cq state ρXE is an (n, k)-source if n = log dX and Hmin(X |E))ρ ≥ k.
It is often convenient to consider the smooth min-entropy, which is obtained by maximizing the min-
entropy over all cq states in an ǫ-neighborhood of ρXE . The definition of this neighborhood depends on a
choice of metric; the canonical choice is the “purified distance”. Since this choice will not matter for us we
defer to [?] for a precise definition.
Definition 5. Let ǫ ≥ 0 and ρXE ∈ D(HX ⊗HE) a cq state. The ǫ-smooth min-entropy of X conditioned
on E is defined as
Hǫmin(X |E)ρ = max
σXE∈B(ρXE ,ǫ)
Hmin(X |E)σ,
where B(ρXE , ǫ) is the ball of radius ǫ around ρXE, taken with respect to the purified distance.
Rather than using Definition 3, we will most often rely on an operational expression for the min-entropy
stated in the following lemma from [KRS09].
Lemma 6 (Min-entropy and guessing probability). For a cq state ρXE ∈ D(HX ⊗ HE), the guessing
probability is defined as the probability to correctly guess X with the optimal strategy to measure E, i.e.
pguess(X |E)ρ = sup
{Mx}
∑
x
pxTr (Mxρ
x
E) , (2.2)
where {Mx} is a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) on HE. Then the guessing probability is related
to the min-entropy by
pguess(X |E)ρ = 2−Hmin(X|E)ρ . (2.3)
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2.3 Extractors
We first give the definition of a strong quantum-proof extractor. Recall the notation (X,E)ρ ≈ǫ (X ′, E′)ρ
for 12‖ρXE − ρX′E′‖1 ≤ ǫ, and Um for a random variable uniformly distributed over m-bit strings.
Definition 7. Let k be an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. A function Ext : HX ×HY → HZ is a strong (k, ǫ) quantum-
proof extractor if for all cq states ρXE ∈ D(HX ⊗ HE) with Hmin(X |E) ≥ k, and for a classical uniform
Y ∈ HY independent of ρXE,
(Ext(X,Y ), Y, E)ρ ≈ǫ (UZ , Y, E)ρ .
There are known explicit constructions of strong quantum-proof extractors.
Theorem 8 ([TSSR11]). For any integers dX , k and for any ǫ > 0 there exists an explicit strong (k, ǫ)
quantum-proof extractor Ext: {0, . . . , dX − 1} × {0, . . . , dY − 1} → {0, . . . , dZ − 1} with log dY = O(log dX)
and log dZ = k −O(log(1/ǫ)−O(1).
We use the same definition of non-malleable extractor against quantum side information that was intro-
duced in the work [CV16]. The definition is a direct generalization of the classical notion of non-malleable
extractor introduced in [DW09]. The first step is to extend the notion that the adversary may query the
extractor on any different seed Y ′ than the seed Y actually used to the case where Y ′ may be generated
from Y as well as quantum side information held by the adversary.
Definition 9 (Map with no fixed points). Let HY , HE and HE′ denote finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
We say that a CPTP map T : L(HY ⊗HE)→ L(HY ⊗HE′) has no fixed points if for all ρE ∈ D(HE) and
all computational basis states |y〉 ∈ HY it holds that
〈y|Y TrHE′
(
T
(|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρE)) |y〉Y = 0 .
The following definition is given in [CV16]:
Definition 10 (Non-mallleable extractor). Let HX , HY , HZ be finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, of respec-
tive dimension dX , dY , and dZ . Let k ≤ log dX and ǫ > 0. A function
nmExt : {0, . . . , dX − 1} × {0, . . . , dY − 1} → {0, . . . , dZ − 1}
is a (k, ǫ) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor if for every cq-state (X,E)ρ on HX ⊗ HE such that
Hmin(X |E)ρ ≥ k and any CPTP map Adv : L(HY ⊗HE)→ L(HY ⊗HE′) with no fixed points,∥∥σnmExt(X,Y )nmExt(X,Y ′)Y Y ′E′ − UZ ⊗ σnmExt(X,Y ′)Y Y ′E′)∥∥1 ≤ ǫ ,
where
σY Y ′XE′ =
1
dY
∑
y
|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ (IX ⊗Adv)(|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρXE) (2.4)
and σnmExt(X,Y )nmExt(X,Y ′)Y Y ′E′ is obtained from σY Y ′XE′ by (classically) computing nmExt(X,Y ) and
nmExt(X,Y ′) in ancilla registers and tracing out X.
2.4 Hölder’s inequality
We use the following Hölder’s inequality for matrices. For a proof, see e.g. [Bha97].
Lemma 11 (Hölder’s inequality). For any n× n matrices A, B, C with complex entries, and real numbers
r, s, t > 0 satisfying 1r +
1
s +
1
t = 1,
‖ABC‖1 ≤ ‖|A|r‖1/r1 ‖|B|s‖1/s1
∥∥|C|t∥∥1/t
1
. (2.5)
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3 Quantum XOR lemma
In this section we prove two XOR lemmas with quantum side information. First we prove a more standard
version, Lemma 13, in Section 3.1. We prove a non-uniform version, Lemma 2, in Section 3.2. Lemma 13
is not actually used in the analysis of our non-malleable extractor, but we include it as a warm-up to our
non-uniform XOR lemma. Since XOR lemmas often play a fundamental role, both lemma might be of
independent interest. The proofs are based on quantum collision probability techniques4 from [TSSR11] to
transform a classical collision probability-based proof into one that also allows for quantum side information.
When restricted to F2, our standard XOR lemma, Lemma 13, is very similar to Lemma 10 of [KK12],
although the result from [KK12] provides a tighter bound in this case.5 However our result applies to Fp,
while it is unclear whether the proof of [KK12] generalizes to p > 2. Our result is based on the use of the
collision probability, while [KK12] uses Fourier analysis. The idea of non-uniform XOR lemma is natural in
the context of non-malleable extractors, and has been explored in [Li12c, CRS12, AHL16]. Our non-uniform
XOR lemma generalizes a restricted version of Lemma 3.15 of [Li12c] to Fp with quantum side information.
6
The quantum collision probability is defined as follows.
Definition 12 (Quantum collision probability). Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) and σB ∈ D(HB). The collision
probability of ρAB, conditioned on σB , is defined as
Γc(ρAB|σB) ≡ Tr
(
ρAB(IA ⊗ σ−1/2B )
)2
, (3.1)
where σB ∈ D(HB).
A careful reader might notice that Γc ≤ 1 is not generally true, so calling Γc collision probability seems
misleading. We give a general definition which allows arbitrary states ρAB and σB to match the existing
literature, but here we always consider cq states ρAB and take σB = ρB. We prove in Corollary 15 that
Γc ≤ 1 in such cases. Γc(ρAB|σB) also reduces to the classical collision probability when both of A,B are
classical and σB = ρB.
We will often use the following relation, also taken from [TSSR11], valid for any ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB):
Tr
(
(ρAB − UA ⊗ ρB)(IA ⊗ ρ−1/2B )
)2
= Γc
(
ρAB|ρB
)− 1
dA
, (3.2)
which can be verified by expanding the square:
Tr
(
(ρAB − UA ⊗ ρB)(IA ⊗ ρ−1/2B )
)2
= Tr
(
ρAB ρ
−1/2
B
)2
− 2Tr
(
ρAB ρ
−1/2
B (UAρB)ρ
−1/2
B
)
+ Tr
(
(UAρB)ρ
−1/2
B
)2
= Γc(ρAB |ρB)− 1
dA
.
4The term “quantum collision probability” is ours.
5[KK12] provides a bound of p2tǫ2 (for p = 2), while ours scales as ptǫ, a quadratic loss.
6Compared to [Li12c, Lemma 3.15] we have m = 1 and n = t.
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3.1 Standard quantum XOR lemma
In this section, we prove our quantum generalization of the standard XOR lemma, Lemma 13, which roughly
states that given a random variable X ∈ Ftp, if 〈a,X〉 is close to uniform for all a 6= 0, then X is close to
uniform.
Lemma 13 (XOR lemma). Let p be a prime power, t an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xt) ∈ Ftp be
a classical random variable, and E some correlated quantum variable. For all a = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Ftp, define
a random variable Z = 〈a,X〉 =∑ti=1 aiXi. If for all a 6= 0, 12 ‖ρaZE − UZ ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ, then
1
2
∥∥ρXE − UX ⊗ ρE∥∥1 ≤ pt/2√2
√
ǫ . (3.3)
To prove Lemma 13, we bound the collision probability as a function of the trace distance in Lemma 16.
To prove Lemma 16 we use the following lemma for “conditioned” cq states.
Lemma 14. For a cq state ρXE with reduced density matrix ρE,
0 ≤
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
ρXE
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
≤ IXE . (3.4)
Proof. We proceed by bounding the eigenvalues of the middle term. Using the fact that ρXE is a cq state,
we observe that
ρ
−1/2
E ρXEρ
−1/2
E =
∑
x
|x〉〈x|ρ−1/2E ρxEρ−1/2E (3.5)
is block diagonal. Combining with the fact that for all states |φ〉 ∈ HE and x in the range of X ,
0 ≤ 〈φ|ρ−1/2E ρxEρ−1/2E |φ〉 ≤ 〈φ|ρ−1/2E ρEρ−1/2E |φ〉 ≤ 1 . (3.6)
We conclude that the eigenvalues of ρ
−1/2
E ρXEρ
−1/2
E are between 0 and 1.
As a corollary of Lemma 14, we can upper bound the quantum collision probability by 1 in certain
settings.
Corollary 15 (Upper bound of quantum collision probability). For any cq state ρXE,
Γc(ρXE |ρE) ≤ 1 . (3.7)
Proof. Using the definition,
Γc(ρXE |ρE) = Tr
(
ρXE
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
ρXE
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))
≤ Tr (ρXEIXE)
≤ 1 , (3.8)
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 14.
The following lemma bounds the collision probability as a function of the trace distance.
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Lemma 16 (Bounding collision probability with trace distance). Let ρXE be a cq state. If
1
2
‖ρXE − UX ⊗ ρE‖1 = ǫ , (3.9)
then
4ǫ2
dX
≤ Γc(ρXE |ρE)− 1
dX
≤ 2ǫ
(
1− 1
dX
)
. (3.10)
Proof. The first inequality follows from Lemma 4 of [TSSR11], we repeat it here for completeness. We use
Hölder’s inequality (Lemma 11) with r = t = 4, s = 2, A = C = IX ⊗ ρ1/4E , and
B =
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/4E
)
(ρXE − UXρE)
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/4E
)
.
This leads to
2ǫ = ‖ρXE − UXρE‖1
= ‖ABC‖1
≤ ∥∥A4∥∥1/4
1
∥∥B2∥∥1/2
1
∥∥C4∥∥1/4
1
=
√
dX Tr
(
(ρXE − UXρE)
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2
=
√
dX
(
Γc(ρXE |ρE)− 1
dX
)
, (3.11)
where we used Eq. (3.2) in the last line. Squaring both sides and dividing by dA, we get the desired inequality.
For the second inequality, we use Lemma 14 to show the following sequence of inequalities
0 ≤
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
ρXE
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
≤ IXE
⇒ − 1
dX
IXE ≤
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
ρXE
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
− UX ⊗ IE ≤
(
1− 1
dX
)
IXE
⇒
∣∣∣ρ−1/2E ρXEρ−1/2E − UXIE∣∣∣ ≤
(
1− 1
dX
)
IXE . (3.12)
Starting with Eq. (3.2), we get
Γc(ρXE |ρE)− 1
dX
= Tr
(
(ρXE − UXρE)
(
IX ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2
= Tr
(
(ρXE − UXρE)
(
ρ
−1/2
E ρXEρ
−1/2
E − UXIE
))
≤ Tr
(
|ρXE − UXρE |
∣∣∣ρ−1/2E ρXEρ−1/2E − UXIE∣∣∣)
≤ Tr
(
|ρXE − UXρE |
(
1− 1
dX
)
IXE
)
= 2ǫ
(
1− 1
dX
)
, (3.13)
where we used Eq. (3.12) to go from the third line to the fourth line.
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Now we are ready to prove Lemma 13. The proof idea is to start from the trace distance of X to uniform,
apply Lemma 16 to get an upper bound in terms of the collision probability of X , apply Eq. (3.2) and expand
the square to express the collision probability of X in terms of the collision probability of 〈a,X〉, and finally
apply Lemma 16 again to get an upper bound in terms of the trace distance of 〈a,X〉 to uniform.
Lemma 13 (restated). Let p be a prime power, t an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xt) ∈ Ftp be a
classical random variable, and E some correlated quantum variable. For all a = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Ftp, define a
random variable Z = 〈a,X〉 =∑ti=1 aiXi. If for all a 6= 0, 12 ‖ρaZE − UZ ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ, then
1
2
∥∥ρXE − UX ⊗ ρE∥∥1 ≤ pt/2√2
√
ǫ . (3.14)
Proof. Note that
ρaZE =
∑
z
|z〉〈z| ⊗
∑
x
δ(z − 〈a, x〉, 0)ρxE . (3.15)
We start by relating the collision probability of Z and X . Using Eq. (3.2),
Γc(ρ
a
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
= Tr
[
(ρaZE − UZρE)IZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
]2
= Tr
[∑
z
|z〉〈z|
∑
x
(
δ (z − 〈a, x〉, 0)− 1
p
)
ρxE
(
IZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)]2
=
∑
z
Tr
[∑
x
(
δ (z − 〈a, x〉, 0)− 1
p
)
ρxEρ
−1/2
E
]2
=
∑
z,x,x′
[
δ (z − 〈a, x〉, 0) δ (z − 〈a, x′〉, 0)− 2
p
δ (z − 〈a, x〉, 0) + 1
p2
]
Tr
(
ρxEρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
=
∑
x,x′
[
δ (〈a, x− x′〉, 0)− 1
p
]
Tr
(
ρxEρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
=
∑
x
(
1− 1
p
)
Tr
(
ρxEρ
−1/2
E ρ
x
Eρ
−1/2
E
)
+
∑
x 6=x′
[
δ (〈a, x− x′〉, 0)− 1
p
]
Tr
(
ρxEρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
.
(3.16)
Averaging over a ∈ Ftp, we get:
Ea
(
Γc(ρ
a
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
)
=
(
1− 1
p
)
Γc(ρXE |ρE) +
∑
x 6=x′
Ea
[
δ (〈a, x− x′〉, 0)− 1
p
]
Tr
(
ρxEρ
−1/2
E ρ
x
Eρ
−1/2
E
)
=
(
1− 1
p
)
Γc(ρXE |ρE) . (3.17)
Dividing both sides by
(
1− 1p
)
gives
Γc(ρXE |ρE) = p
p− 1Ea
(
Γc(ρ
a
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
)
. (3.18)
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Having the most computational-heavy step done, we put the pieces together to prove our XOR lemma.∥∥ρXE − UX ⊗ ρE∥∥21 ≤ pt Γc(ρXE |ρE)− 1
= pt
(
p
p− 1
)
Ea
(
Γc(ρ
a
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
)
− 1
=
(
p
p− 1
)∑
a 6=0
(
Γc(ρ
a
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
)
+
(
Γc(ρ
0
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
)− 1
≤
(
p
p− 1
)[
(pt − 1)2ǫ
(
1− 1
p
)
+
(
1− 1
p
)]
− 1
≤ 2ptǫ . (3.19)
On the first line we use Lemma 16, the second line we use Eq. (3.18), and the fourth line we use Lemma 16
and Corollary 15. Dividing both sides by 4 and taking the square root, we get the desired result
1
2
‖ρXE − UX ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤
pt/2√
2
√
ǫ . (3.20)
3.2 Non-uniform XOR lemma
Our non-uniform XOR lemma bounds the distance to uniform of a ccq state, a state with two classical
registers and one quantum register. Roughly speaking, the lemma states that given two random variables
X0 ∈ Fp and X ∈ Ftp, if X0 + 〈a,X〉 is close to uniform, then X0 is close to uniform given X .
Lemma 2 (restated). Let p be a prime power, t an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. Let ρX0XE be a ccq state with X0 ∈ Fp
and X = (X1, . . . , Xt) ∈ Ftp. For all a = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Ftp, define a random variable Z = X0 + 〈a,X〉 =
X0 +
∑t
i=1 aiXi. If for all a,
1
2 ‖ρaZE − UZ ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ, then
1
2
∥∥ρX0XE − UX0 ⊗ ρXE∥∥1 ≤ p(t+1)/2√2
√
ǫ . (3.21)
The proof of the non-uniform XOR lemma follows the same structure as the proof of the standard XOR
lemma in Section 3.1: we bound the collision probability by the trace distance in Lemma 18, then prove the
non-uniform XOR lemma based on that. First we establish the analogue of Eq. (3.2) for any ccq state ρXZE :
Tr
(
(ρXZE − UX ⊗ ρZE)(IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E )
)2
= Tr
(
ρXZE ρ
−1/2
E
)2
− 2Tr
(
ρXZE ρ
−1/2
E (UXρZE)ρ
−1/2
E
)
+ Tr
(
(UXρZE)ρ
−1/2
E
)2
= Γc(ρXZE |ρE)− 1
dX
Γc(ρZE |ρE) . (3.22)
Similar to Lemma 14, we need the following lemma to bound the collision probability by the trace distance
in Lemma 18.
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Lemma 17. Let ρXZE be a ccq state. Then
− 1
dX
IXZE ≤
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
(ρXZE − UX ⊗ ρZE)
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
≤
(
1− 1
dX
)
IXZE . (3.23)
Proof. We bound the eigenvalues of the middle expression. Since ρXZE is a ccq state, we know that the
middle expression
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
(ρXZE − UX ⊗ ρZE)
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
=
∑
x,z
|x〉〈x| ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ ρ−1/2E
(
ρxzE −
1
dX
ρzE
)
ρ
−1/2
E
(3.24)
is block diagonal, where ρzE =
∑
x ρ
xz
E and ρE =
∑
x,z ρ
xz
E . For any state |φ〉 ∈ HE and x, z in the range of
X,Z,
〈φ|ρ−1/2E
(
ρxzE −
1
dX
ρzE
)
ρ
−1/2
E |φ〉 ≥ 〈φ|ρ−1/2E
(
− 1
dX
ρzE
)
ρ
−1/2
E |φ〉 ≥ −
1
dX
. (3.25)
This proves the first inequality. We also have
〈φ|ρ−1/2E
(
ρxzE −
1
dX
ρzE
)
ρ
−1/2
E |φ〉 = 〈φ|ρ−1/2E
(
ρxzE −
1
dX
∑
x′
ρx
′z
E
)
ρ
−1/2
E |φ〉
=
(
1− 1
dX
)
〈φ|ρ−1/2E ρxzE ρ−1/2E |φ〉 −
1
dX
∑
x′ 6=x
〈φ|ρ−1/2E ρxzE ρ−1/2E |φ〉
≤
(
1− 1
dX
)
. (3.26)
This proves the second inequality.
We then bound the collision probability by the trace distance as in Lemma 16.
Lemma 18 (Bounding collision probability with trace distance, non-uniform). Let ρXZE be a ccq state. If
1
2
‖ρXZE − UXρZE‖1 = ǫ , (3.27)
then
4ǫ2
dXdZ
≤ Γc(ρXZE |ρE)− 1
dX
Γc(ρZE |ρE) ≤ 2ǫ
(
1− 1
dX
)
. (3.28)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 16. For the first inequality, we use Hölder’s inequality
(Lemma 11) with r = t = 4, s = 2, A = C = IXZ⊗ρ1/4E , andB =
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/4E
)
(ρXZE − UXρZE)
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/4E
)
.
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This leads to
2ǫ = ‖ρXZE − UXρZE‖1
= ‖ABC‖1
≤ ∥∥A4∥∥1/4
1
∥∥B2∥∥1/2
1
∥∥C4∥∥1/4
1
=
√
dXdZ Tr
(
(ρXZE − UX ⊗ ρZE)
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2
=
√
dXdZ
(
Γc(ρXZE |ρE)− 1
dX
Γc(ρZE |ρE)
)
, (3.29)
where we used Eq. (3.22) in the last line. Squaring both sides and dividing by dXdZ , we get the desired
inequality. For the second inequality, we use Lemma 17 to show that
− 1
dX
IXZE ≤
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
(ρXZE − UX ⊗ ρZE)
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
)
≤
(
1− 1
dX
)
IXZE
⇒
∣∣∣(IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E ) (ρXZE − UX ⊗ ρZE)(IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E )∣∣∣ ≤
(
1− 1
dX
)
IXZE . (3.30)
Starting with Eq. (3.22), we have
Γc(ρXZE |ρE)− 1
dX
Γc(ρZE |ρE)
= Tr
(
(ρXZE − UX ⊗ ρZE)
(
IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2
≤ Tr
(
|ρXZE − UXρZE |
∣∣∣(IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E ) (ρXZE − UX ⊗ ρZE)(IXZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E )∣∣∣)
≤ Tr
(
|ρXZE − UXρZE |
(
1− 1
dX
)
IXZE
)
= 2ǫ
(
1− 1
dX
)
, (3.31)
where we used Eq. (3.30) on the fourth line.
Now we restate and prove the non-uniform XOR lemma. The proof idea is to start from the trace distance
of X0 given X to uniform, apply Lemma 18 to get an upper bound in terms of the collision probability of
X0 given X , apply Eq. (3.22) and expand the square to express the collision probability of X0 given X in
terms of the collision probability of X0 + 〈a,X〉, and finally apply Lemma 18 again to get an upper bound
in terms of the trace distance of X0 + 〈a,X〉 to uniform.
Lemma 2 (restated). Let p be a prime power, t an integer and ǫ ≥ 0. Let ρX0XE be a ccq state with X0 ∈ Fp
and X = (X1, . . . , Xt) ∈ Ftp. For all a = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Ftp, define a random variable Z = X0 + 〈a,X〉 =
X0 +
∑t
i=1 aiXi. If for all a,
1
2 ‖ρaZE − UZ ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ, then
1
2
∥∥ρX0XE − UX0 ⊗ ρXE∥∥1 ≤ p(t+1)/2√2
√
ǫ . (3.32)
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Proof. We start by relating the collision probability of Z and X0 + 〈a,X〉:
Γc(ρ
a
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
= Tr
[
(ρaZE − UZρE)IZ ⊗ ρ−1/2E
]2
= Tr
[∑
z
|z〉〈z|
∑
x,x0
(
δ (z − x0 − 〈a, x〉, 0)− 1
p
)
ρx0xE IZρ
−1/2
E
]2
=
∑
z
Tr
[∑
x0x
(
δ (z − x0 − 〈a, x〉, 0)− 1
p
)
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E
]2
=
∑
z,x0,x′0,x,x
′
[
δ (z − x0 − 〈a, x〉, 0) δ (z − x′0 − 〈a, x′〉, 0)−
2
p
δ (z − x0 − 〈a, x〉, 0) + 1
p2
]
· Tr
(
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′0x
′
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
=
∑
x0,x′0,x,x
′
[
δ (x0 − x′0 + 〈a, x− x′〉, 0)−
1
p
]
Tr
(
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′0x
′
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
=
∑
x0,x′0,x
(
δ (x0 − x′0, 0)−
1
p
)
Tr
(
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′0x
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
+
∑
x0,x′0,x 6=x
′
[
δ (x0 − x′0 + 〈a, x− x′〉, 0)−
1
p
]
Tr
(
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′0x
′
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
=
∑
x0,x
Tr
(
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E ρ
x0x
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
− 1
p
∑
x0,x′0,x
Tr
(
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′0x
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
+
∑
x0,x′0,x 6=x
′
[
δ (x0 − x′0 + 〈a, x− x′〉, 0)−
1
p
]
Tr
(
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′0x
′
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
= Γc(ρX0XE |ρE)−
1
p
Γc(ρXE |ρE)
+
∑
x0,x′0,x 6=x
′
[
δ (x0 − x′0 + 〈a, x− x′〉, 0)−
1
p
]
Tr
(
ρx0xE ρ
−1/2
E ρ
x′0x
′
E ρ
−1/2
E
)
. (3.33)
When we average over a, the last term vanishes,
Ea
(
Γc(ρ
a
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
)
= Γc(ρX0XE |ρE)−
1
p
Γc(ρXE |ρE) . (3.34)
With the heavy work done, we put everything together and prove the lemma
‖ρX0XE − UX0ρXE‖21
pt+1
≤ Γc(ρX0XE |ρE)−
1
p
Γc(ρXE |ρE)
= Ea
(
Γc(ρ
a
ZE |ρE)−
1
p
)
≤ 2ǫ , (3.35)
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where we used Lemma 18 one the first line, Eq. (3.34) on the second line, Lemma 18 and the assumption
of the lemma on the third line. Multiplying both sides by p
t+1
2 and take a square root, we get the desired
result:
1
2
‖ρX0XE − UX0ρXE‖1 ≤
p(t+1)/2√
2
√
ǫ . (3.36)
4 Quantum-Proof Non-malleable Extractor
In this section we introduce our non-malleable extractor and prove its security. The extractor was first
considered by Li [Li12c]. We use the symbol ‖ for concatenation of strings, and for a, b ∈ Fnp write 〈a, b〉 for
the standard inner product over Fnp .
Definition 19 (Inner product-based non-malleable extractor). Let p 6= 2 be a prime. For any even integer
n, define a function nmExt : Fnp × Fn/2p → Fp by nmExt(X,Y ) = 〈X,Y ||Y 2〉, where Y 2 is defined as in
Section 2.1.
Theorem 1. Let p 6= 2 be a prime. Let n be an even integer. Then for any ǫ > 0 the function nmExt(X,Y ) =
〈X,Y ‖Y 2〉 is an ((n2 + 6) log p− 1 + 4 log 1ǫ , ǫ) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on a reduction showing that any successful attack for an adversary to
nmExt leads to a good strategy for the players in a certain communication game, that we introduce next.
4.1 A communication game
Let p 6= 2 be a prime. Let n be an even integer, and g : Fn/2p × Fn/2p → Fnp an arbitrary function such that
for any z ∈ Fnp there are at most two possible pairs (y, y′) such that y 6= y′ and g(y, y′) = z. Consider the
following communication game, called guess(n, p, g), between two players Alice and Bob.
1. Bob receives y ∈ Fn/2p .
2. Alice creates a cq state ρXE , where X ∈ Fnp , and sends the quantum register E to Bob.
3. Bob returns y′ ∈ Fn/2p and b ∈ Fp.
The players win if and only if b = 〈x, g(y, y′)〉 and y′ 6= y.
The following lemma bounds the players’ maximum success probability in this game as a function of the
min-entropy of Alice’s input X , conditioned on her message to Bob.
Lemma 20 (Success probability of the communication game). Suppose there exists a communication protocol
for Alice and Bob in guess(n, p, g) that succeeds with probability at least 1p + ǫ, on average over a uniformly
random choice of input y to Bob. Then Hmin(X |E)ρ ≤ n2 log p+ 1 + 2 log 1ǫ .
Proof. Let ρXE =
∑
x |x〉〈x|X⊗ρxE be the cq state prepared by Alice. A strategy for Bob is a family of POVM
{My′,by }y′,b, indexed by y ∈ Fn/2p and with outcomes (y′, b) ∈ Fn/2p × Fp. We can assume that {My
′,b
y }y′,b is
projective, since Alice can send ancilla qubits along with ρ and allow Bob to apply Naimark’s theorem to
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his POVM in order to obtain a projective measurement; this will change neither his success probability nor
the min-entropy of Alice’s state. By definition, the players’ success probability in guess(n, p, g) is
1
p
+ ǫ =
∑
x
p−
n
2
∑
y
∑
y′
∑
b
δ(b, 〈x, g(y, y′)〉)Tr(My′,by ρxE) . (4.1)
For each u ∈ Fp let Ay′y,u =
∑
b ω
ubMy
′,b
y , where ω = e
2iπ
p . By inversion, My
′,b
y =
1
p
∑
u ω
−ubAy
′
y,u. Replacing
this into (4.1) we obtain
1
p
+ ǫ =
1
p
∑
u
p−
n
2
∑
y
∑
y′
∑
b
δ(b, 〈x, g(y, y′)〉)ω−ubTr(Ay′y,u ρxE)
≤ 1
p
+
(
1− 1
p
)
max
u6=0
∣∣∣p−n2 ∑
y
∑
y′
∑
b
δ(b, 〈x, g(y, y′)〉)ω−ubTr(Ay′y,u ρxE)∣∣∣ , (4.2)
where for the second line we used that
∑
y′ A
y′
y,0 =
∑
y′,bM
y′,b
y = IE .
Fix u 6= 0 that achieves the maximum in (4.2). For fixed y, define the map Ty,u on HE by
Ty,u : |ψ〉 7→
∑
y′
|y′〉Ay′y,u|ψ〉 . (4.3)
Ty,u has norm at most 1, since
T †y,uTy,u =
∑
y′
(Ay
′
y,u)
†Ay
′
y,u =
∑
y′
∑
b
(
My
′,b
y
)2
= IE .
For the second equality we used that {My′,by }y′,b is projective. Therefore we can complete Ty,u into a unitary
map by adding arbitrary, unused outcomes; for simplicity we’ll assume Ty,u itself is unitary.
Consider the following guessing strategy for an adversary holding side information ρxE about x. The
adversary first prepares a uniform superposition over y. Conditioned on y, it applies the map Ty,u. It
computes g(y, y′) in an ancilla register, and erases (y, y′), except for one bit of information r(y, y′) ∈ {0, 1},
which specifies which pre-image (y, y′) is, given g(y, y′) (this is possible by the 2-to-1 assumption on g). The
adversary applies a Fourier transform on the register containing g(y, y′), using ωu = ω
−u as primitive p-th
root of unity (this is possible since u 6= 0 and p is prime). It measures the result and outputs it as a guess
for x. Formally, the transformation this implements is
|ψ〉 7→ p−n4
∑
y
|y〉
∑
y′
|y′〉Ay′y,u|ψ〉
7→ p−n4
∑
y,y′
|g(y, y′)〉|r(y, y′)〉Ay′y,u|ψ〉
7→
∑
v
|v〉
(
p−
3n
4
∑
y,y′
ω〈v,g(y,y
′)〉
u |r(y, y′)〉Ay
′
y,u
)
|ψ〉 .
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The adversary’s success probability in guessing v = x on input ρxE is therefore
ps =
∑
x
Tr
((
p−
3n
4
∑
y,y′
ω〈x,g(y,y
′)〉
u |r(y, y′)〉 ⊗Ay
′
y,u
)
ρxE
(
p−
3n
4
∑
y,y′
ω−〈x,g(y,y
′)〉
u 〈r(y, y′)| ⊗ (Ay
′
y,u)
†
))
=
1
p
3n
2
∑
x
∑
r∈{0,1}
Tr
(( ∑
y,y′: r(y,y′)=r
ω〈x,g(y,y
′)〉
u A
y′
y,u
)†( ∑
y,y′: r(y,y′)=r
ω〈x,g(y,y
′)〉
u A
y′
y,u
)
ρxE
)
≥ 1
p
3n
2
∑
x
1
2
Tr
((∑
y,y′
ω〈x,g(y,y
′)〉
u A
y′
y,u
)†(∑
y,y′
ω〈x,g(y,y
′)〉
u A
y′
y,u
)
ρxE
)
, (4.4)
where for the last line we used a2 + b2 ≥ 12 (a+ b)2. Now, recall from (4.2) and our choice of u that
ǫ ≤ p−n2
∣∣∣ ∑
x,y,y′
ω−u(〈x,g(y,y
′)〉) Tr
(
Ay
′
y,u ρ
x
E
)∣∣∣
≤ p−n2
(∑
x
Tr(ρxE)
)1/2(∑
x
Tr
((∑
y,y′
ω−u(〈x,g(y,y
′)〉)Ay
′
y,u
)
ρxE
(∑
y,y′
ω−u(〈x,g(y,y
′)〉)Ay
′
y,u
)†))1/2
, (4.5)
where the inequality is Cauchy-Schwarz. Comparing (4.4) and (4.5) gives
ps ≥ 1
2
p−
n
2 ǫ2 .
We conclude using that by Lemma 6, Hmin(X |E) ≤ − log ps.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we give the proof of Theorem 1. Towards this we first prove a preliminary lemma showing
that a certain function, based on the definition of nmExt, has few collisions.
Lemma 21. Let p 6= 2 be a prime and n an even integer. For a ∈ Fp define a function ga : Fn/2p ×Fn/2p → Fnp
by
ga(y, y
′) = y + ay′‖y2 + ay′2 , (4.6)
where y2 is defined in Section 2.1. Then for any a ∈ Fp, a 6= 0 and z ∈ Fnp there are at most 2 distinct pairs
(y, y′) such that y′ 6= y and ga(y, y′) = z.
Proof. We use the bijection defined in Section 2.1 to interpret y and y′ in Fpn/2 . For a 6= 0, we fix an image
ga = (c, d), where c, d are interpreted as elements of Fpn/2 , and solve for (y, y
′) in Fpn/2 × Fpn/2 satisfying
y + ay′ = c , (4.7)
y2 + ay′2 = d . (4.8)
Using (4.7) to eliminate y we get
(c− ay′)2 + ay′2 = d
⇒ (a+ a2)y′2 + (−2ca)y′ + (c2 − d) = 0 . (4.9)
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Since (4.9) is a quadratic equation, there are at most two solutions unless all coefficients are zero. Since
p 6= 2, −2 6= 0. If all coefficients are zero, −2 6= 0, and a 6= 0, then c = d = 0, a = −1, which implies y′ = y
by (4.7) and contradicts our assumption. So there are at most two different y′ that can be mapped to (c, d).
By (4.7) each y′ corresponds to a unique y, so there are at most two pre-images.
We are ready to give the proof of Theorem 1. The proof depends on a simple lemma relating trace
distance and guessing measurements, Lemma 22, which is stated and proved after the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let k =
(
n
2 + 6
)
log p−1+4 log 1ǫ and ρXE ∈ D(Cp
n ⊗HE) an (n log p, k)-source. Fix a
CPTPmap Adv : L(Cp
n/2⊗HE)→ L(Cpn/2⊗HE′)with no fixed points, and define σnmExt(X,Y )nmExt(X,Y ′)Y Y ′E′
as in Definition 10. Given the definition of nmExt, to prove the theorem we need to show that
(〈X,Y ‖Y 2〉, 〈X,Y ′‖Y ′2〉, Y ′, Y, E′)σ ≈ǫ (UFp , 〈X,Y ′‖Y ′2〉, Y ′, Y, E′)σ . (4.10)
Applying the XOR lemma, Lemma 2, with X0 = 〈X,Y ||Y 2〉, X = 〈X,Y ′||Y ′2〉, E = (Y ′, Y, E′) and
t = 1, (4.10) will follow once it is shown that
(〈X,Y ||Y 2〉+ a〈X,Y ′‖Y ′2〉, Y ′, Y, E′)σ ≈ 2ǫ2
p2
(UFp , Y
′, Y, E′)σ , (4.11)
for all a ∈ Fp. For a = 0, (4.11) follows from the fact that inner product is a quantum-proof two source
extractor, which can be shown by the combination of Theorem 5.3 of [CLW14] and Lemma 1 in [LLTT05].
For non-zero a ∈ Fp, recall the function ga : Fn/2p × Fn/2p → Fnp defined in (4.6). Lemma 21 shows that for
any a 6= 0, the restriction of ga to {(y, y′) : y 6= y′} is at most 2-to-1, which is ensured by the fact that Adv
has no fixed points. We establish (4.11) by contradiction. Assume thus that
(〈X, ga(Y, Y ′)〉, Y ′, Y, E′)σ ≈ 2ǫ2
p2
(UFp , Y
′, Y, E′)σ (4.12)
does not hold, for some non-zero a ∈ Fp. Fix such an a and write ga for g. From Lemma 22 it follows that
there exists a POVM measurement {Mz}z∈Fp on σY ′Y E′ such that
∑
z∈Fp
Tr
(
MzσzY Y ′E
) ≥ 1
p
+
2ǫ2
p3
, (4.13)
where σzY Y ′E is the reduced density of σ on Y Y
′E conditioned on 〈X, g(Y, Y ′)〉 = z. To conclude the proof
of the theorem we show that the adversary’s map Adv and the POVM {Mz} can be combined to give
a “successful” strategy for the players in the communication game introduced in Section 4.1. To see this,
consider the state ρXE that is instantiated as the source for the extractor; by definition Hmin(X |E)ρ = k =(
n
2 + 6
)
log p− 1 + 4 log 1ǫ . In the third step of the game, Bob applies the map Adv to the registers Y and
E containing his input Y and the state sent by Alice, and measures to obtain an outcome Y ′. He then
applies the measurement {Mz} on his registers (Y, Y ′, E) to obtain a value b = z ∈ Fp that he provides as
his output in the game. By (4.13) it follows that this strategy succeeds in the game with probability at least
1
p +
2ǫ2
p3 , which by Lemma 20 implies Hmin(X |E) ≤ n2 log p+1+2 log p
3
2ǫ2 , contradicting our choice of k. This
proves (4.11) and thus the theorem.
The following lemma is used in the proof of the theorem.
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Lemma 22. Let ρXE =
∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE be such that
1
2
‖(X,E)− (U,E)‖1 = 1
2
∥∥ρXE − UX ⊗ ρE∥∥1 = ǫ ,
where UX is the totally mixed state on X and ρE =
∑
x ρ
x
E. Then there exists a POVM {Mx} on ρE such
that ∑
x
Tr(Mxρ
x
E) =
1
dX
+
ǫ
dX
.
Proof. Since ρXE is a cq state, ‖ρXE−UX ⊗ρE‖1 =
∑
x ‖ρxE− 1dX ρE‖1. For each x, let M ′x be the projector
onto the positive eigenvalues of ‖ρxE − 1dX ρE‖1, so∑
x
Tr(M ′x(ρ
x
E −
1
dX
ρE)) =
1
2
∑
x
‖ρxE −
1
dX
ρE‖1 . (4.14)
LetM ′ =
∑
xM
′
x andMx =
1
dX
(M ′x+(IE− 1dXM ′)). ThenMx ≥ 0 and
∑
xMx =
1
dX
(M ′+dXIE−M ′) = IE .
Moreover,
∑
x
Tr(Mxρ
x
E) =
∑
x
Tr
[
1
dX
(M ′x + (IE −
1
dX
M ′))ρxE
]
=
1
dX
[∑
x
(Tr(M ′xρ
x
E)) + Tr
(
(IE − 1
dX
M ′)ρE
)]
=
1
dX
+
1
dX
∑
x
(
Tr(M ′xρ
x
E)−
1
dX
Tr(M ′xρE)
)
=
1
dX
+
1
dX
(∑
x
Tr
(
M ′x(ρ
x
E −
1
dX
ρE)
))
=
1
dX
+
1
2dX
∑
x
∥∥∥ρxE − 1dX ρE
∥∥∥
1
by (4.14).
5 Privacy amplification
Dodis and Wichs [DW09] introduced a framework for constructing a two-message privacy amplification
protocol from any non-malleable extractor. In [CV16] it is shown that the same framework, when instantiated
with a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor nmExt as defined in Definition 10, leads to a protocol that
is secure against active quantum adversaries. In Section 5.1 we recall the Dodis-Wichs protocol, and state
the security guarantees that follow by plugging in our non-malleable extractor construction. The guarantees
follows from the quantum extension of the Dodis-Wichs results in [CV16]; since that work has not been
published we include their results regarding the Dodis-Wichs protocol in Appendix A.
In Section 5.2 we show that a different protocol for privacy amplification due to Dodis et al. [DKK+12],
whose main advantage is of being a one-round protocol, is also quantum-proof. The construction and analysis
of the protocol of [DKK+12] is simple, with the drawback of a large entropy loss.
20
We start with the definition of a quantum-secure privacy amplification protocol against active adversaries.
A privacy amplification protocol (PA, PB) is defined as follows. The protocol is executed by two parties Alice
and Bob sharing a secret X ∈ {0, 1}n, whose actions are described by PA, PB respectively.7 In addition there
is an active, computationally unbounded adversary Eve, who might have some quantum side information E
correlated with X but satisfying Hmin(X |E)ρ ≥ k, where ρXE denotes the initial state at beginning of the
protocol.
Informally, the goal for the protocol is that whenever a party (Alice or Bob) does not reject, the key R
output by this party is random and statistically independent of Eve’s view. Moreover, if both parties do not
reject, they must output the same keys RA = RB with overwhelming probability.
More formally, we assume that Eve is in full control of the communication channel between Alice and
Bob, and can arbitrarily insert, delete, reorder or modify messages sent by Alice and Bob to each other. At
the end of the protocol, Alice outputs a key RA ∈ {0, 1}m ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a special symbol indicating
rejection. Similarly, Bob outputs a key RB ∈ {0, 1}m∪{⊥}. The following definition generalizes the classical
definition in [DLWZ11].
Definition 23. Let k,m be integer and ǫ ≥ 0. A privacy amplification protocol (PA, PB) is a (k,m, ǫ)-privacy
amplification protocol secure against active quantum adversaries if it satisfies the following properties for
any initial state ρXE such that Hmin(X |E)ρ ≥ k, and where σ be the joint state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at
the end of the protocol:
1. Correctness. If the adversary does not interfere with the protocol, then Pr[RA = RB∧ RA 6=⊥ ∧ RB 6=⊥
] = 1.
2. Robustness. This property comes in two flavors. The first is pre-application robustness, which states
that even in the presence of an active adversary, Pr[RA 6= RB ∧ RA 6=⊥ ∧ RB 6=⊥] ≤ ǫ. The second
is post-application robustness, which is defined similarly, except the adversary is additionally given the
key RA that is the result of the interaction (PA, PE), and the key RB that results from the interaction
(PE , PB), where PE denotes the adversary’s actions in its interaction with Alice and Bob.
3. Extraction. Given a string r ∈ {0, 1}m ∪ {⊥}, let purify(r) be a random variable on m-bit strings
that is deterministically equal to ⊥ if r =⊥, and is otherwise uniformly distributed. Let V denotes the
transcript of an execution of the protocol execution, and ρE′ the final quantum state possessed by Eve.
Then the following should hold:
(RA, V, E
′)σ ≈ǫ (purify(RA), V, E′)σ and (RB , V, E′)σ ≈ǫ (purify(RB), V, E′)σ .
In other words, whenever a party does not reject, the party’s key is indistinguishable from a fresh
random string to the adversary.
The quantity k −m is called the entropy loss.
5.1 Dodis-Wichs protocol with non-malleable extractor
Here we first recall the Dodis-Wichs protocol for privacy amplification (hereafter called Protocol DW ), which
is summarized in Figure 5.1, and the required security definitions, taken from [CV16]. We then state the result
obtained by instantiating the protocol with the quantum-proof non-malleable extractor from Theorem 1.
7It is not necessary for the definition to specify exactly how the protocols are formulated; informally, each player’s actions
is described by a sequence of efficient algorithms that compute the player’s next message, given the past interaction.
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Protocol DW
Let dX , dY , d2, ℓ, dZ , t, k be integers and ǫMAC, ǫExt, ǫnmExt > 0.
Let MAC : {0, . . . , dZ−1}×{0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}t be a one-time ǫMAC-information-theoretically secure message
authentication code.
Let Ext : {0, . . . , dX−1}×{0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}m be a strong (k−ℓ−log(1/ǫExt), ǫExt) quantum-proof extractor.
Let nmExt : {0, . . . , dX − 1} × {0, , . . . , dY − 1} → {0, . . . , dZ − 1} be a (k, ǫnmExt) quantum-proof non-
malleable extractor.
It is assumed that both parties, Alice and Bob, have access to a shared random variableX ∈ {0, . . . , dX−1}.
1. Alice samples a YA uniformly from {0, , . . . , dY − 1}. She sends YA to Bob. She computes
Z = nmExt(X,YA).
2. Bob receives Y ′A from Alice. He samples a uniform YB ∼ Ud2, and computes Z ′ = nmExt(X,Y ′A)
and W = MAC(Z ′, YB). He sends (YB,W ) to Alice. Bob then reaches the KeyDerived state
and outputs RB = Ext(X,YB).
3. Alice receives (Y ′B,W
′) from Bob. If W ′ = MAC(Z, Y ′B) she reaches the KeyConfirmed state
and outputs RA = Ext(X,Y
′
B). Otherwise she outputs RA =⊥.
Figure 5.1: The Dodis-Wichs privacy amplification protocol.
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Aside from the use of a strong quantum-proof extractor (Definition 7) and a quantum-proof non-malleable
extractor (Definition 10), the protocol relies on an information-theoretically secure one-time message authen-
tication codes, or MAC. This security notion is defined as follows.
Definition 24. A function MAC : {0, . . . , dZ − 1}×{0, 1}d→ {0, 1}t is an ǫMAC-information-theoretically
secure one-time message authentication code if for any function A : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}d × {0, 1}t it
holds that for all m ∈ {0, 1}d
Pr
k←UZ
[
(MAC(k,m′) = σ′) ∧ (m′ 6= m) : (m′, σ′)← A(m,MAC(k,m))] ≤ ǫMAC.
Efficient constructions of MAC satisfying the conditions of Definition 24 are known. The following
proposition summarizes some parameters that are achievable using a construction based on polynomial
evaluation.
Proposition 25 (Proposition 1 in [RK05]). For any ǫMAC > 0, integer d > 0, dZ ≥ d2ǫ2
MAC
, there exists an
efficient family of ǫMAC-information-theoretically secure one-time message authentication codes
{MAC : {0, . . . , dZ − 1} × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}t}d∈N
with t ≤ log d+ log(1/ǫMAC).
The correctness and security requirements for the protocol are natural extensions of the classical case
(see Definition 18 in [DW09]). Informally, the adversary has the following control over the outcome of the
protocol. First, it possess initial quantum side information E about the weak secret X shared by Alice and
Bob. That is, it has a choice of a cq source ρXE , under the condition that Hmin(X |E) is sufficiently large.
Second, the adversary may intercept and modify any of the messages exchanged. In Protocol DW there
are only two messages exchanged, YA from Alice to Bob and (YB , σ) from Bob to Alice. To each of these
messages the adversary may apply an arbitrary transformation, that may depend on its side information E.
We model the two possible attacks, one for each message, as CPTP maps T1 : L(HY ⊗HE)→ L(HY ⊗HE′)
and T2 : L(C
2d2 ⊗H2t ⊗HE′)→ L(C2d2 ⊗ C2t ⊗HE′′), where H denotes the Hilbert space associated with
system E. Note that we may always assume that H is large enough for the adversary to keep a local copy
of the messages it sees, if it so desires.
The following result on the security of protocol DW is shown in [CV16]. We include the proof in
Appendix A.
Theorem 26. Let k, t, dZ and ǫMAC, ǫExt, ǫnmExt be parameters of Protocol DW, as specified in Figure 5.1.
Let nmExt be a (k, ǫnmExt) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor, Ext a strong (k−log dZ−log(1/ǫExt), ǫExt)
quantum-proof extractor, and MAC an ǫMAC-information-theoretically secure one-time message authentica-
tion code. Then for any active attack (ρXE , T1, T2) such that Hmin(X |E)ρ ≥ k, the DW privacy amplification
protocol described in Figure 5.1 is (k,m, ǫ)-secure as defined in Definition 23 with ǫ = O(ǫExt + ǫnmExt +
ǫMAC).
Combined with Theorem 1 stating the security of our construction of a quantum-proof non-malleable
extractor, Theorem 26 provides a means to obtain privacy amplification protocol secure against active attacks
for a range of parameters. Due to the limitations of our non-malleable extractor we are only able to extract
from sources whose entropy rate is at least 12 . This is a typical setting in the case of quantum key distribution,
where the initial min-entropy satisfies Hmin(X |E) ≥ α log dX for some constant α which depends on the
protocol and the noise tolerance, but is generally larger than 3/4. Specifically, we obtain the following:
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One-round Privacy Amplification Protocol
Let n, k be integers and ǫ > 0. Let v = n− k + log(1/ǫ) and m = (n/2)− v.
It is assumed that both parties, Alice and Bob, have access to a shared random variable X ∈ {0, 1}n. They
interpret X as a pair X = (X1, X2) where X1, X2 are identified as elements in F2n/2.
1. Alice samples a Y uniformly from F2n/2 and computes Z = Y X1+X2. Let W = [Z]
v
1 be the first
v bits of Z. She sends (Y,W ) to Bob and outputs RA = [Z]
n/2
v+1, the remaining part of Z.
2. Bob receives (Y ′,W ′) from Alice and computes Z ′ = Y ′X1+X2. IfW
′ = [Z ′]v1 , then Bob outputs
RB = [Z
′]
n/2
v+1. Otherwise he outputs ⊥.
Figure 5.2: The one-round privacy amplification protocol from [DKK+12].
Corollary 27. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a constant c > 0, such that the following holds. For any active
attack (ρXE , T1, T2) such that Hmin(X |E)ρ = k ≥ 12 log dX + c · log(1/ǫ), there is an O(ǫ)-secure DW protocol
that outputs a key of length m = k −O(log(1/ǫ)).
Proof. Let p be a prime and n a positive integer such that log p = Θ(log(1/ǫ)) and dX = p
n. Let dY = p
n/2,
and dZ = p. Also, let d2 = O(log dX), m = k−O(log(1/ǫ)), and t = O(log(1/ǫ)). We instantiate Theorem 26
with the following.
• Let Ext : {0, . . . , dX−1}×{0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}m be the (k−O(log(1/ǫ)), ǫ) strong quantum-proof extractor
from Theorem 8.
• Let nmExt : {0, . . . , dX − 1} × {0, , . . . , dY − 1} → {0, . . . , dZ − 1} be the (12 · log dX +O(log(1/ǫ)), ǫ)
non-malleable extractor from Theorem 1.
• Let MAC : {0, . . . , dZ − 1} × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}t be the one-time ǫ-information-theoretically secure
message authentication code from Proposition 25.
The result follows.
5.2 One-round Privacy Amplification Protocol
In this section we show that the one-round protocol of Dodis et al. [DKK+12] is also quantum-proof. This
protocol has significantly higher entropy loss, (n/2) + log(1/ǫ), than the DW protocol we presented in the
previous section.
Theorem 28. For any integer n and k > n/2, and any ǫ > 0, the protocol in Figure 5.2 is a one-round
(k,m, ǫ)-quantum secure privacy amplification protocol with post-application robustness and entropy loss k−
m = (n/2) + log(1/ǫ).
Proof. Correctness and extraction follow as in the classical proof by observing that Ext(X,Y ) = Y X1 +X2
is a quantum-proof extractor since hY (X1, X2) = Y X1 + X2 is a family of universal hash function, which
is shown to be a quantum-proof strong extractor in [TSSR11]. For robustness, the classical proof does not
generalize directly. We prove post-application robustness as follows.
24
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose post-application robustness is violated, i.e. Pr[RA 6= RB∧ RA 6=⊥
∧ RB 6=⊥] > ǫ. Then there is an initial state ρXE with Hmin(X |E)ρ ≥ k and a CPTP map T : L(HY ⊗
HW ⊗HRA ⊗HE)→ L(HY ⊗HW ⊗HE′) that can be applied by an adversary Eve to produce a modified
message that is accepted by Bob with probability greater than ǫ. Note that T has RA as input since we
consider post-application robustness. Let (Y ′,W ′, E′) = T (Y,W,RA, E). If post-application robustness is
violated, then Pr[W ′ = [Y ′X1 +X2]
v
1] > ǫ.
Consider the following communication game: Alice has access to a cq-state ρXE . Alice samples a uni-
formly random Y , computes W = [Y X1+X2]
v
1, RA = [Y X1+X2]
n/2
v+1, and sends E, Y , W , and RA to Bob.
They win if Bob guesses X correctly from E, Y , W , and RA. Using the map T introduced above, Bob can
execute the following strategy. First, apply T on Alice’s message to generate a guess (Y ′,W ′). Second, guess
a uniformly random R′B. Third, use Y, Y
′, (W,RA) = Y X1 +X2, and (W
′, R′B) = Y
′X1 +X2 to solve for a
unique X = (X1, X2). Note that Bob succeeds if the guesses (Y
′,W ′) and R′B in the first two steps are both
correct (i.e., (W ′, R′B) = Y
′X1+X2), which has probability greater than ǫ · 2−((n/2)−v). On the other hand,
we can upper bound the winning probability of the communication game using the min entropy assumption
H(X |E)ρ ≥ k. Since Y is independent of X and the length of (W,RA) is n/2, Hmin(X |E, Y,W )ρ ≥ k−(n/2).
Thus the winning probability is less than 2−(k−(n/2)). Putting the two calculations together we have
ǫ · 2−((n/2)−v) ≤ Pr[ Bob wins ] ≤ 2−(k−(n/2)),
which implies v < n− k − log(1/ǫ), a contradiction.
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A The Dodis-Wichs Protocol
In this appendix we reproduce the proof of Theorem 26, taken from [CV16].
Proof of Theorem 26. Let an active attack on Protocol DW be specified by
• A cq state ρXE ∈ D(HX ⊗HE) such that Hmin(X |E)ρ ≥ k;
• A CPTP map T1 : L(HY ⊗ HE) → L(HY ⊗ HE′) whose output on the first registered is sys-
tematically decohered in the computational basis; formally, for any ρY E , T1(ρY E) =
∑
y(|y〉〈y|Y ⊗
IdE)T1(ρY E)(|y〉〈y|Y
⊗ IdE);
• A CPTP map T2 : L(C2d2 ⊗ C2t ⊗HE′)→ L(C2d2 ⊗ C2t ⊗HE′′).
Given an active attack (ρXE , T1, T2) we instantiate random variables YA, Z, Y
′
A, YB , Z
′, σ, Y ′B , σ
′ and RA, RB
in the obvious way, as defined in the protocol and taking into account the maps T1 and T2, applied successively
to determine Y ′A and (Y
′
B , σ
′).
The correctness of the protocol is clear.
To show robustness, let σY ′AYAXE′ denote the joint state of Y
′
A, YA (which represents a local copy of YA
kept by Alice), X , and Eve’s registers after her first map T1 has been applied. Further decompose ρ as
a sum of sub-normalized densities σ=Y ′AYAXE′
, corresponding to conditioning on Y ′A = YA, and σ
⊥
Y ′AYAXE
′ ,
corresponding to conditioning on Y ′A 6= YA.
Conditioned on Y ′A = YA, by definition of a MAC the probability that (Y
′
B ,W
′) 6= (YB ,W ) and Alice
reaches the KeyConfirmed state is at most ǫMAC. If (Y
′
B,W
′) = (YB,W ) then RA = RB, so that in this
case robustness holds with error at most ǫMAC.
Now suppose Y ′A 6= YA. Consider a modified adversary Adv′ that keeps a copy of YA, applies the map
T1, and if Y
′
A = YA replaces Y
′
A with a uniformly random string that is distinct from YA. This adversary
implements a CPTP map T ′1 that has no fixed point. By the assumption that nmExt is a quantum-proof
non-malleable extractor,
σ′nmExt(X,YA)nmExt(X,Y ′A)YAY ′AE′
≈ǫnmExt Um ⊗ σ′nmExt(X,Y ′A)YAY ′AE′ , (A.1)
where here Y ′AE
′ is defined as the output system of the map T ′1 implemented by Adv
′. Conditioned on
YA 6= Y ′A the maps T1 and T ′1 are identical, thus it follows from (A.1) and the definition of ρ⊥ that
σ⊥nmExt(X,YA)nmExt(X,Y ′A)YAY ′AE′
≈ǫnmExt Um ⊗ σ⊥nmExt(X,Y ′A)YAY ′AE′ ,
where now the states are sub-normalized. Since Z ′ = nmExt(X,Y ′A) this means that the key used by
Alice to verify the signature in Step 3. of Protocol DW is (up to statistical distance ǫnmExt) uniform and
independent of the key used by Bob to make the MAC. By the security of MAC, the probability for Alice
to reach the KeyConfirmed state in this case is at most ǫnmExt + ǫMAC. Adding both parts together,
Pr(RA /∈ {RB,⊥}) ≤ ǫnmExt + 2ǫMAC. Since RB is never ⊥, this implies the robustness property.
For the extraction property, it is sufficient to show that (RB, V, E) ≈ǫ (Um, V, E) since then key extraction
property follows from the robustness and the fact that RB is never ⊥. We have that RB = Ext(X,YB) is close
to uniform given V = YAYBW and E
′, and we need to establish two properties: first, independence between
X and YB given YAZ
′E′ and second, that the source has enough entropy conditioned on YAZ
′E′. Regarding
the first property, observe that conditioned on YAZ
′, X and YB are independent given E
′. Regarding the
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source entropy, by the chain rule for the (smooth) min-entropy [VDTR13], it follows thatHǫExtmin (X |YAZ ′E′) ≥
k − log dZ − c log(1/ǫExt) for some constant c > 0. Note that∥∥(RB , V, E′)σ − (Um, V, E′)σ∥∥1 ≤ ∥∥(RB, YA, YB , Z ′, E′)σ − (Um, YA, YB , Z ′, E′)σ∥∥1,
which follows since W is a deterministic function YB and Z
′. Using that Ext is a strong quantum-proof
extractor, we conclude that (RB , V, E) ≈ǫ (Um, V, E), as long as ǫ is such that ǫ > ǫExt.
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